AI compared with Examiner Assessment: Evaluating Interpretations of Henry VII

Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the reign of Henry VII.

Student's Answer

Green argues that Henry VII's reign was achieved by his frugal nature. They argue that Henry's shrewdness with money was the product of his own insensitivity and greed. Green focuses in Henry's financial aims in his suppression of the nobility. Whilst they are convincing in suggesting that Henry was incredibly frugal in his financial policy, Green is less convincing in suggesting that this was the result of his miserly character. Henry's shrewdness was mainly rooted in his desire to ensure dynastic security.

Green is unconvincing is suggesting that Henry's 'main concern' was the 'accumulation of treasure' necessary to avoid having parliament. Whilst it is true that Henry VII called parliament just a total of seven times during his reign and therefore Green is convincing in asserting that Henry intended to avoid over-reliance on power parliament, it is unfair to suggest that Henry's financial aims were rooted in a desire to avoid parliament. Instead, Henry was over-concerned with the security of his own Crown, this, rather than his personal greed led to his frugal finical policy. Green is fairy convincing in suggesting that Henry 'hoarded' money. Despite and annual pension from France of £5000 and his accumulation of crown lands at the beginning of his reign, through Acts of Attainder against the Yorkist nobility, Henry continued to seek desperate measures to increase crown finance. This can be seen in his asking for donations to Arthur's baptism (after his death in 1509) as based on traditional prerogative rights. Nevertheless, Henry's shrewd financial policy and limitation of parliament cannot be deemed the product of his 'mean' or 'jealous' character. Henry intended to ensure a strong financial position for his successor to ensure the security of the Tudor dynasty.

Green also argues that Henry 'broke the power of the magnates. This is particularly convincing at the beginning of Henry VII's reign when he was most concerned with asserting monarchical dominance. He dated his reign to the day prior to Battle of Bosworth, the 21st Aug 1485, to ensure that all Yorkist nobility involved against him could be considered traitors. He was thus able to impose the magnates with bonds and therefore extract their wealth and ensure their complicity. Whilst this did serve to improve royal finance, it was most successful in its aim to reduce noble wealth. Green is unconvincing in suggesting that ‘retaining' laws against the nobility were 'enforced with the utmost severity considering the fact that Henry made changes to allow retaining when licensed.

Overall, Green is convincing in their assertation of Henry's shrewd and frugal approach to crown finance. Green over exaggerated the 'severity of Henry's actions and overestimates the role that his own greed underpinned financial policy.

Guy argues that Henry was a sensible and ept king who was both respected and powerful. He argues that Henry was able to centralise English government through his politic skill and reputation. He argues that this is what earned Henry his dynastic security rather than his divine right to kinship. Guy is convincing in his assertion of Henry's governing skill, however over-exaggerates his political presence.

Guy is convincing in suggesting that Henry was neither blood thirsty or self-centred. This can be seen in his peaceable foreign policy that certainly lacked the delusion of English power evident in his son's reign. To suggest, however, that Henry led his army to France because the 'nobility admired highly chivalric Kings' is an exaggeration. Henry's invasion of France, late into the campaigning season was used to pressure the French king into a peace treaty. As Henry knew the king would be concerned with his stance in the Italian wars, Henry used his invasion for tactical foreign policy (the French king would be keen to settle the dispute). Therefore, while Guy is convincing in suggesting that Henry was a competent leader, neither self-centred or blood thirsty, he is not convincing in suggesting that Henry's policies were ever rooted in desire to pander to the nobility's admiration for kinship and chivalry.

Guy is convincing is asserting that Henry VII helped to 'centralise' English politics. He is unconvincing, however, in suggesting that this owes to a reconsideration of his appearance as a 'shadowy and remote king. Henry VII's increased centralisation of politics was largely a response to the betrayal of Sir William Stanley, his step-uncle and trusted Lord Chamberlain. Having been exposed as a conspirator in the Warbeck plot, Stanley was tried and executed. This, Henry sought to establish the privy Chamber where only the King's most trusted advisers could gain favour, and where favour could be very easily lost. This did not owe to the diminishment of Henry's 'shadowy and remote reputation. In fact, his investment of power in just a few royal councillors, like Empson and Dudley served to perpetuate this perception of him especially considering their incredibly unpopular financial policies. Whilst Guy is correct in stating that they ‘served the throne for the Tudors', this was not the product of his 'dynamic force.' His centralised form of govt created fear rather than admiration.

In conclusion, Guy is convincing in suggesting that Henry was a competent King and that his policies helped to centralise government. He is less convincing in suggesting that Henry ever acted in the interest of the nobility (especially in his invasion of France) and his assertion that Henry gained a personable political presence.

Lockyer argues that Henry was never successful in fully asserting monarchical authority. He argues that Henry was restricted by the English formalities of power, Lockyer asserts that due to his own military weakness, Henry was dependent on English property owners. He states that Henry was ultimately dependent on the complicity of his nation. Lockyer is convincing in his suggestion that Henry was largely dependent on landowners and local government, but overestimates Henry's weakness in this policy. Henry ultimately pursued the most effective means of ensuring law and order.

To suggest that Henry was never an 'absolute monarch' is and over exaggeration. Whilst Henry was subject to multiple threats to his throne (including plots that sought to replace him like Simnel and Warbeck) he ultimately remained supreme. His victory at the Battle of Stoke in 1487 suggest that his ‘standing army' were capable of defending his monarchical authority. Though he was dependent on property owners' such as the traditional northern magnates to operate on behalf of him in further regions, by the end of his reign, this method proved effective. Henry's initial ploy to impose southern nobility on northern region proved unsuccessful, during to Henry's reliance on northern property owners.

Lockyer over exaggerated Henry's devotion of power to 'men on the spot'. Whilst Henry's reliance on local government did sometimes mean impulsively recruiting men whom he did fully trust, such as Duke of Norfolk, his aptitude in central government ensured that this did not impose too much of a difficulty. By ensuring his own centralised power (by suppressing nobility with Acts of attainder, bonds and recognizance) Henry ensured that this reliance on landowners was underpinned by his undoubted monarchical authority and centralised power. This, whilst Lockyer is convincing in suggesting that Henry relied on the 'cooperation of the political nation' he is less convincing in suggesting that Henry was not an absolute monarch.